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Information Pooling and Collusion:
Implications for The Livestock Mandatory
Reporting Act
Kenneth Njoroge

Abstract
This paper develops a conceptual model that analyzes the impact of increasing market transparency under the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 on the incentives for collusion in
the U.S. meatpacking industry. More than likely, meatpackers will have asymmetric priors regarding the distribution of livestock prices. Moreover, they lack the incentives to voluntarily reveal
their real priors. Thus, the enforcer of the Act faces a problem of asymmetric information regarding the informativeness of publicly disclosed market reports relative to that of packers’ priors.
Analytical results predict that divergent priors of Bayesian packers can be updated by more informative market reports, so that the resultant posteriors converge, enabling packers to identify a
more efficient, unanimous trigger price. This enhances observability of deviations from collusive
behavior, and increases the internal policing efficiency by a cartel that employs trigger price strategies to monitor deviations by its members. Contrary to the Act’s well-intended objectives, this is
consistent with promoting collusion and decreasing market efficiency.
KEYWORDS: Mandatory price reporting, collusion, livestock, oligopsony, trigger pricing

Njoroge: Information Pooling and Collusion

1

1. Introduction
The industrialization of agriculture has led to significant changes in the structure
of U.S. livestock and meat markets. Of particular importance is increased backward
vertical integration and coordination through packer ownership of livestock, use of
marketing arrangements and forward contracts, resulting in a large proportion of
livestock transactions going unreported1. As a consequence, livestock producers believe
markets have become less and less transparent, making it more and more difficult to
discover the “right” price for their product. In response, U.S. Congress enacted the
Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act 1999 (hereafter the Act). The Act was passed with
the stated objectives of providing easily understandable market information with greater
precision, scope and reliability to all market participants so that they can make informed
decisions; and increasing transparency in the livestock and meat price discovery process,
thereby enhancing competition in the market place for livestock and livestock products.
The Act differs from voluntary reporting in three ways2. First, under voluntary
reporting, the Agricultural Marketing Service (hereafter AMS)3 collected only negotiated
spot trade information. Under the Act, AMS now collects all types of transactions.
Second, under voluntary reporting, AMS employed self-discretion to preserve
confidentiality. Under the Act, AMS now sets the confidentiality guidelines for
disclosure. Third, under voluntary reporting, AMS collected information from packers
and feeders throughout the day. Now, reporting packers are required to electronically
submit information to AMS at scheduled times.
Only packers who slaughter above 125,000 cattle, 100,000 swine and 75,000
lambs and importers with annual average imports of 5,000 metric tons of lamb must
report to AMS. Packers must report entire transactions but are exempt from reporting
livestock purchases from public auction markets. The Act also specifies the schedule of
reporting. To preserve confidentiality, AMS restricts disclosure of the reported data
through confidentiality guidelines. The Act stipulates civil penalties of up to $10,000 per
misreporting violation and requires a quarterly audit and reviews that could be more
frequent if necessary.
As of this writing, the Act has been in place for two years, and it took as many
years for its supporters to get it through Congress. However, with the exception of one
study (Azzam, 2003), the agricultural economics literature has yet to evaluate the claims
that led to its enactment. Those claims are well summarized by a question in a larger
questionnaire sent out in August 2002 by Agricultural Committee Chairman Larry
Combest (R-Texas) to farm and producer groups, agricultural economists, and the
1

As much as 35-40% of all cattle transactions, 75% of all hog transactions, and 40% of all lamb
transactions are by private marketing arrangements..
2
The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 amended the voluntary market news program instituted
by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946.
3
AMS enforces the Act and discloses the reported data subject to confidentiality guidelines. The current
confidentiality guideline is the 3/70/20 rule. This means that over a 60-day period, at least 3 packers have
to submit data at least 50% of the time; (2) No one reporting packer can account for more than 70% of the
data in a report; (3) The same reporting packer cannot be the only reporting packer for more than 20% of
the time.
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secretary of Agriculture. Specifically, the question reads: “Mandatory price reporting was
advocated as necessary to improve market transparency and price discovery. Implicit in
the arguments of individuals advocating mandatory price reporting was the idea that this
improvement would lead to higher prices for producers. What has been the effect of
mandatory price reporting on producer prices?”
While extensive literature on voluntary information sharing exists, literature on
mandatory information reporting is limited. In a study of the Danish ready-mixed
concrete industry, Albaek, Mollgaard and Overgaard (1997) show that disclosure of data
from mandatory information reporting led to collusive behavior in which prices increased
and the variance in prices across firms diminished. Since there were no significant
changes in costs, inputs or technology, the study predicts that firms exploited the
government information sharing program to enhance collusive behavior and raise prices.
Wachenheim and Devuyst (WD) (2001) conclude that the three most important
issues regarding the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act are: the benefits of price data at
a national or even regional level of aggregation, whether the USDA can report these data
at a more localized basis and maintain confidentiality, and whether mandatory price
reporting will lead to collusive pricing by meat packers. Without a formal model, and
relying mostly on findings from previous theoretical studies and evidence from other
industries, WD posit that, if AMS discloses disaggregated data, the likelihood of
collusive pricing will increase.
Defining an increase in transparency as the degree to which the volatility of
livestock and meat prices is reduced as more information is provided by the Act, Azzam
(2003) constructed a theoretical model to study the consequences of such transparency
for the structure, conduct and performance of the livestock industry. He concluded that
“the usefulness of the Act to the livestock industry may not be in the value of the reported
information to feeders, as the supporters of the Act claim. Rather, by forcing packers to
pool information at negligible marginal cost, the Act may foster more competitive
conduct in the procurement of livestock.” However, Azzam’s results are based on the
assumption that packers hold consistent conjectures in equilibrium. Since consistent
conjectures do not accommodate conduct that is less competitive that Cournot, Azzam’s
model assumes the Act does not afford packers the opportunity to use information from
the Act as a vehicle for collusion.
Serious concerns regarding fair competition and trade practices in the
meatpacking industry go back to the turn of the last century. Back then; Congress
enacted the Packers and Stockyards (hereafter P&S) Act in 1921. These concerns have
persisted, motivating numerous reviews of the P&S Act. GIPSA4 is the USDA agency
that administers the P&S Act. Thus, concern about the potential for collusion is crucial
and highly relevant in the meatpacking industry. The ideas presented here should only be
considered a starting-point into which extensions may add additional institutional and
theoretical detail in the hope of providing better tools for scrutinizing industry conduct.

4

Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) is part of USDA’s Marketing and
Regulatory Programs, whose mandate is to enforce fair and competitive trading practices. GIPSA has a
regulatory program known as the Packers and Stockyards Program, under which fair and open competitive
practices are enforced.
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The contribution of this paper is to develop a conceptual model to analyze the
impact of the Act on the potential for non-cooperative collusion through trigger price
strategies. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows how asymmetric priors can
generate interest disparity amongst packers and impede the potential for trigger price
strategies. Section 3 shows how AMS market reports can update asymmetric priors of
Bayesian packers so that the resultant posteriors converge, enabling packers to identify a
more effective unanimous trigger price. Section 4 presents the concluding remarks.
2. Asymmetric Priors and Non-Cooperative Collusion
To motivate a conceptual framework, I follow Azzam (2003) and consider a
homogenous, risk-neutral oligopsony of n packers, whose objective is to maximize the
expected utility of individual profits. Let the oligopsony face a common supply function:
W = W (Q ) + e ,
(1)
where W is the observable stochastic component of the price of livestock and W (Q ) is
the non-stochastic component given by:
W (Q ) = a + bQ = a + bqi + bQ−i ,
(2)
where a and b are the intercept and the slope of the supply curve respectively, qi is the
quantity procured by packer i , and Q−i is the aggregate livestock quantity by all other
packers except packer i . Finally, e is the random additive noise that consists of both the
random shock to the factors of livestock production, and the random noise from the
noisiness of the market signals. It is assumed that e , is identically and independently
distributed with zero mean, a CDF, F (e ) and an associated PDF, f (e ) . Both f (e ) and
F (e ) are assumed to be continuously differentiable, and F (e ) is a non-decreasing
function, with F (− ∞ ) = 0 and F (+ ∞ ) = 1 . Thus, W is a random variable with a CDF, a
corresponding PDF and an associated parameter vector, θ .
As a prelude to the description of the packer game, I specify the meaning of
incomplete and imperfect information as it applies in this paper. First, imperfect
information refers to uncertainty in the history of the game up to the decision-making
point. Thus, before she makes a move, a packer with imperfect information faces
uncertainty regarding the other packers’ past actions thus far. Second, incomplete
information refers to uncertainty regarding the game’s payoffs.
To be consistent with an incomplete and imperfect information structure, we
adopt the model developed by Spence (1978). In this model, the stochastic supply
function captures incomplete information by introducing event uncertainty into the
game’s payoffs. Further, this model captures imperfect information by restricting the best
response functions of packers, so that they only observe noisy market signals and not
each other’s actions.
Effectively, at each move in the game, each packer decides whether or not to cheat on
the cartel. Owing to a stochastic livestock supply, each packer faces uncertainty regarding
the game’s payoffs (including individual payoffs). Since she exclusively depends on
noisy market signals to detect past rival behavior up to her decision making point, each
packer faces uncertainty regarding her rivals’ past livestock quantities. Thus, if packers

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization

4

Vol. 1 [2003], Article 14

observe an unexpectedly high price of livestock, they face uncertainty regarding whether
this was caused by cheating, or by a stochastic shift of the livestock supply. To begin
with, we deliberately assume the distribution of the observable price of livestock is
common knowledge, thus imposing symmetric priors across packers.
Having specified the game’s information structure, the next step is to consider an
infinite horizon game, one in which each packer’s objective is to maximize her expected
present discounted value of profits under this information structure.
Following Porter (1983), suppose packers employ the Green-Porter enforcement
mechanism, in an infinite horizon game. In this case, they revert to Cournot-Nash
equilibrium levels of livestock for a finite number of (T − 1) periods whenever the
observable market price of livestock W rises above a predetermined, unanimous trigger
price Wˆ .
Specifically, under the Green-Porter enforcement mechanism, we describe packers’
strategies as follows:
1) In the initial period t = 0 , each packer extends a goodwill gesture by purchasing a
suggestively collusive quantity of livestock qiNC . This results in a collusive vector

(

)

of livestock quantities, q NC = q1NC ,......,qnNC , that is smaller than the CournotNash Equilibrium (hereafter CE) quantity vector q CE , such that q NC < q CE .
2) In any subsequent period t , each packer extends the collusive period by
purchasing qiNC , as long as W ≤ Ŵ in the previous period (t − 1) .
3) If in any period t − 1 , W > Ŵ , regardless of the apparent cause, each packer shifts
to the punishment period by purchasing a punitive CE quantity, qiCE , resulting in

(

)

the quantity vector q CE = q1CE ,...., q nCE in period t , and continues purchasing
this quantity for T periods until period [t + (T − 1)] and then reverts to the

collusive quantity qiNC in period (t + T ) .
Since the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is self-enforcing, no packer has an incentive to
deviate from the punishment phase. If we assume that packers face a common, discount
factor β within the range 0 < β < 1 , then the expected present discounted value of
packer i ’s profits is:
 T −1

Vi q NC = Π i q NC + Pr W > Wˆ .∑ β t Π i q CE + β T Vi q NC  + Pr W < Wˆ β Vi q NC ,
 t =1

(3)
Inserting W = W (Q ) + e from equation (1) into equation (3), we obtain:

( )

( )

( )

(

)

( )

( ) (
) ( )

)

(

( )

) ( )

( )

( )


T −1
Vi q NC = Π i q NC + Pr W (Q ) + e > Wˆ . ∑ β t Π i q CE + β T Vi q NC 

 t =1
+ Pr W (Q ) + e < Wˆ β V q NC

(

i

Noting that:
Pr W (Q ) + e ≥ Wˆ = Pr e ≥ Wˆ − W (Q ) = 1 − Pr e < Wˆ − W (Q ) = 1 − Fe Wˆ − W (Q)

{

}

{

}

{

} [
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{

}

(

)

Pr W (Q ) + e < Wˆ = Pr e < Wˆ − W (Q) = Fe Wˆ − W (Q ) ,
we obtain:
 T −1

Vi q NC = Π i q NC + 1 − Fe Wˆ − W (Q ) . β t Π i q CE + β T Vi q NC 
 t =1

NC
ˆ
+ F W − W (Q ) βV q ,

( )

[ (
e

( ) [

)] ∑

(

( )

( )

)] ( )

(4)

i

where the first term on the RHS is packer i ’s expected profit in the initial period, (t = 0 ) ,
and the next two terms capture her expected present discounted value of profits in the
next period. The probability that the observable market price of livestock will exceed the
predetermined unanimous trigger price serves as the weight for the punishment period,
while the probability that it remains below this trigger price serves as the weight for the
collusive period. We can proceed to solve for the expected present discounted value of
packer i ’s collusive profits (hereafter Vi ) to get:

[

)]

(

 T −1

Π i (q NC ) + 1 − Fe Wˆ − W (Q ) .∑ β t Π i (q CE )
 t =1

Vi (q NC ) =
T
T
ˆ
1 − β − (β − β )Fe W − W (Q )

( )

Vi q NC =

[

(

( )

( ) ( )
(
) (

)]

Π i q CE
Π i q NC − Π i q CE
+
.
(1 − β ) 1 − β T − β − β T Fe Wˆ − W (Q )

[

)]

(5)

At this juncture, it is crucial to note that Porter’s model deals with symmetric
firms that share a common discount factor, β , and a commonly observed cumulative
density function (CDF) of the price of livestock, FW (w) . Thus, the model assumes the
distribution of livestock prices is common knowledge, and thus, packers have symmetric
priors. Porter gives two reasons for imposing symmetry. The first is that the resultant
symmetric equilibrium enables a detailed examination of the nature of the effects of the
probability distribution function of the stochastic “supply” element, F (e ) , on the optimal
equilibrium solution. The second is “to abstract from problems the cartel may face in
trying to reconcile disparate interests”. Clearly, Porter acknowledges that heterogeneity
across firms could indeed impede collusion but this is obviously not the focus of his
paper and hence the assumption.
Given that interest disparity is a factor that determines the potential for noncooperative collusion by a cartel of asymmetric packers, a more detailed scrutiny on
whether the Act could reconcile such disparity amongst packers should be very
interesting and useful in studying the impact of the Act on the potential for collusion.
Predictably, asymmetric discount factors are the most important source of interest
disparity amongst packers. However, since discount factors are exogenous to AMS, the
Act is unable to reconcile such disparity. As a result, the subsequent analysis will
deliberately impose symmetry across discount factors.
Recall that in the infinite horizon game described above, after the initial period, if
in any period t − 1 , W > Wˆ , each packer shifts to the punishment period by purchasing
qiCE in period t . Each packer detects the consequence of the cartel’s actions in the
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previous period by using her idiosyncratically perceived distribution of W to test the
hypothesis that the vector of livestock quantities in the previous period was consistent
with the collusive vector q NC = q1NC ,..,q nNC . Effectively, the trigger price Wˆ is an upper
tail critical value of this hypothesis test, based on each packer’s idiosyncratic priors and
yet, it must be unanimous across the cartel. Obviously, divergent priors amongst packers
will impede and could render the identification of this unanimous trigger price infeasible.
It is more plausible that, in practice, packers possess asymmetric priors. If a
packer’s priors are more precise than those of her counterparts, she has the opportunity to
unilaterally cheat on the cartel without detection. Predictably, packers would lack the
incentive to voluntarily reveal their real priors to each other. It is therefore highly
unlikely that the previous voluntary reporting program could have significantly mitigated
prior asymmetries across packers. Accordingly, asymmetric priors are a second source of
interest disparity across packers. To the extent that imposing symmetric priors sacrifices
a model’s ability to predict the impact of the Act on interest disparity, this simplification
is unnecessarily restrictive for the intended analysis and therefore inadmissible.
The divergence of priors determines the feasibility of a unanimous trigger price
by packers. If priors are too divergent, the identification of a unanimous trigger price is
clearly infeasible. It is crucial to emphasize that a unanimous trigger price is by
definition, a necessary condition for a sustainable trigger price strategy. From the outset,
we emphasize that subject to discount factors β i , packers with asymmetric priors could
feasibly identify a unanimous trigger price Wˆ , employ trigger price strategies, and reach
a non-symmetric collusive equilibrium. To show how packers can achieve this, let us
consider asymmetric priors, and thereby rewrite equation (4) as:
T −1
Vi q NC = Π i q NC + 1 − Fei Wˆ − W (Q ) . ∑ β t Π i q CE + β TVi q NC 
 t =1

NC
i ˆ
+ Fe W − W (Q ) βVi q ,

(

)

( ) ( ) [ (
[ (
)] ( )
Fei (Wˆ − W (Q )) is packer i ’s

)]

( )

( )

where
idiosyncratically perceived probability of the
observable market price of livestock staying below the trigger price, based on her private
idiosyncratic priors. Thus, depending on her idiosyncratic priors, each packer will now
assign idiosyncratic weights to the punishment and collusive periods. Effectively, each
packer will perceive an idiosyncratic present discounted value of profit depending on her
priors (Thus, under asymmetric priors, Vi is no longer symmetric across packers). As a
result, we can now rewrite equation (5) as:
Π q CE
Π i q NC − Π i q CE
Vi q NC = i
+
.
(1 − β ) 1 − β T − β − β T Fei Wˆ − W (Q )
Following Porter, a non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by an
equilibrium vector of livestock quantities, q NC* = q1NC* ,......,q nNC* , a unanimous trigger
price Wˆ , and a punishment period T if:

( )

( )

( ) ( )
(
) (

[

)]

(

(

)

{

)

}

Vi q NC* = Max Vi (q ) q j = q*j , ∀j ≠ i, qi ≥ 0 .

The first order necessary condition for this maximization problem is:
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[

(

) (

( ) }

)]{

*
*
0 = ∂Vi q NC / ∂qi = 1 − β T + β T − β Fei Wˆ − W (Q ) . ∂Π i q NC / ∂qi
+ Π i q NC* − Π i q CE . β T − β f ei Wˆ − W (Q ) .b.

[ (

)

( )] (

) (

)

(6)

( )

We can derive the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (CE) profit by packer i , Π i q CE
follows: Π i (q ) = [P − a − (qi + Q−i )b]qi ⇒ ∂Π i (q ) / ∂qi = [P − a − (2qi + Q−i )b]

[ (

as

)]

∂ Π i qiCE , Q−i / ∂qi = P − a − 2bqiCE − bQ−i = 0 ⇒ qiCE = (P − a − Q−i ) / 2b ,
where P is the price packers receive for their output. If we assume packers are otherwise
symmetric in all other aspects except in their priors, the resultant qiCE and associated

( )

Π i q CE are:

( )

qiCE = (P − a )[(n + 1)b]−1 ⇒ Π i q CE = (P − a )2 [(n + 1)b]−1.
*
= δ j qiNC* , where δ j is a coefficient of
To allow for asymmetric quantities, let q NC
j

symmetry, (so that perfect symmetry is a special case in which δ j = 1, ∀j = (1,...., n ) ,

and Q * = nq NC * ). The aggregate quantity of livestock quantities in collusive periods is
n

*
Q * = ∑ δ j qiNC * . We can now rewrite equation (6) above in terms of q NC
as:
j

j =1

[1 − β + (β
T

T

)]

) (




 n
− β Fei Wˆ − W (Q )  P − a −  ∑ δ j + 1bqiNC* 

 j =1



(7)
n

 NC*  NC* (P − a )2  T

i
= −   P −  a + ∑ δ j bqi  qi −
 β − β f e Wˆ − W (Q ) b.
(
)
+
1
n
b
j =1 




The solution to the FOC in equation (7) is the Nash equilibrium quantity vector
q NC* Wˆ , T , which is a function of a unanimous trigger price Wˆ , and a punishment
period T . The equilibrium present discounted value of packer i is thus a function of Wˆ
and T i.e. V * Wˆ , T for i = 1,...., n . Effectively, there exists a range of potential levels of

(

(

) (

)

)

i

(

)

the trigger price, Wˆ , and an associated range of potential non-symmetric equilibria
available to a cartel whose members have asymmetric priors. Within this range of trigger
prices, each packer idiosyncratically perceives her optimal trigger price as the one that
maximizes her present discounted value.
If we retrace Porter’s derivations, we can show that in the absence of interest
disparity, if an optimal trigger price, Wˆ * , is chosen from the range of potential trigger
prices to maximize the Vi , the resultant optimal equilibrium quantity of livestock by each
packer is common across all packers and is given by:
−1
qiNC* = (P − a ) + (n + 1) f e Wˆ * − W (Q ) . f e/ Wˆ * − W (Q ) .(2bn )−1.
(8)

{

[ (

)][ (

)]

}

However, in the case of asymmetric priors, it is questionable whether interest disparity
could permit a single optimal trigger price to be common across all packers. Predictably,
the greater is the divergence of priors, the smaller is the range of potential unanimous
trigger prices and the smaller is the range of the associated enforceable equilibria. Thus,
the greater is the divergence of priors, the less likely that a cartel will identify a trigger
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price that is commonly optimal across its members. As a result, the greater is the
divergence of priors, the smaller is the scope for sustainable trigger price strategies.
In sum, the impact of asymmetric priors on the potential for non-cooperative
collusion has two possible outcomes. First, if priors are too divergent, packers are unable
to identify a unanimous trigger price, in which case sustainable non-cooperative collusion
is infeasible. Second, even when packers can feasibly identify a unanimous trigger price,
divergence of priors limits the scope of non-cooperative collusion by restricting packers
from identifying a commonly optimal trigger price and its associated optimal noncooperative equilibrium.
The present study is not the first to consider the potential for non-cooperative
collusion amongst firms with asymmetric information. Radner (1986) posits a model for
games in which players do not discount future utility. In one class of these games, players
lack a commonly observed consequence (e.g. price, profit or output) to detect cheating.
The model posits an enforcement mechanism in which, at each period, each player tests
the hypothesis that all other players have not been cheating based on the successive
observations of her own utilities, but is also able to announce the outcome of her tests to
the others. The model uses a convexity assumption to bound the expected achievable
utility from cheating (by any one player) by a linear function of the observed statistics.
The study shows that by using this mechanism, players could achieve a supergame
equilibrium. A follow-up study by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986) provides an
example, where players do discount future utilities.
In addition to the monitoring mechanism posited by Radner (1986), a cartel could
also detect cheating through monitoring market shares; exploiting most favored party
clauses or monitoring geographically allocated markets among other strategies. Thus,
trigger price strategies are not the only enforcement mechanism that is available to a
cartel of packers. However, most of the other mechanisms that a cartel can employ to
detect cheating besides trigger price strategies are exogenous to the Act. Specifically, the
Act involves increasing the informativeness of AMS market reports, potentially
providing a commonly observed statistic to the cartel. Thus, the Act’s impact on other
collusive strategies besides trigger price strategies is predictably not as profound. For this
reason, the scope of this paper is specifically limited to how the Act could impact the
potential for trigger price strategies.
I shall show that, by increasing the informativeness of AMS market reports, the
Act can provide a commonly observed distribution of livestock prices on the basis of
which cartel members can test their hypotheses. This can reconcile the interest disparity
that arises from asymmetric priors amongst packers and thus increase the policing
efficiency of trigger price strategies. Thus, contrary to its intended objectives, the Act can
potentially promote collusion rather than competition. This is the primary motivation for
the subsequent analysis.
3. Bayesian Updating: How Asymmetric Priors Converge
In the context of the Act, packer’s priors refer to idiosyncratic conjectures about
the distribution of W before that packer gains access to the market reports that are
publicly disclosed by AMS under the Act. Likewise, a packer’s posterior distribution
describes that packer’s knowledge about W conditional on AMS market reports. Assume

http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol1/iss1/art14
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all packers are Bayesian decision makers. Let f i (θ ) , be packer i ‘s idiosyncratic prior
PDF of the parameter vector θ , that contains the mean and variance of W .
If a random sample of k iid observations W = (W1 ,....,Wk ) is drawn from AMS
market reports, it generates a noisy market signal that constitutes the likelihood function
L(θ W ) . The likelihood function is of the form: L(θ W ) = ∏ f (W j θ ). Depending on its
k

j =1

informativeness relative to that of a packer’s priors, a market signal can update the
packer’s priors. Once a packer accesses this signal, her posterior PDF, f i (θ W ), will
contain both her prior PDF, f i (θ ) , and the entire evidence from the signal.
To motivate intuition regarding how a signal generated by AMS market reports
could update a packer’s priors, let us consider the well-known, normal-conjugate
framework5. According to Box and Tiao (1973 p.20) and Zellner (1987 p. 46), if the
distribution of a prior is locally uniform over the range in which the distribution of a
given likelihood assumes appreciable values, then such a likelihood function dominates
the prior in the posterior. Effectively, the normal-conjugate framework predicts that as
long as the precision of the market signal is considerably greater than that of a packer’s
priors, then the packer will learn from the signal and update her priors. Moreover, in this
particular case, as the sample size and the precision of the signal increase, the packer
assigns a weight that approaches zero to her priors (thus disregarding her prior
prejudices), so that the shape of her posteriors approaches that of the signal.
However, according to Schlaifer, Raiffa, and Pratt (1995 p.221), if a prior is
considerably more precise than a given likelihood, then the prior dominates, and the
shape of the posterior will in this case be similar to that of the prior. Effectively, such a
signal is relatively non-informative since it reveals nothing that the packer did not already
know. Thus, a packer does not learn from such a signal, and she assigns a weight that
approaches zero to its evidence irrespective of the number of observations. As a result,
the prejudice that is inherent in such a packer’s priors will dominate her posteriors.
To illustrate, consider AMS market reports obtained through the voluntary
reporting program. Suppose that these market reports consist of weekly averages of
nationally aggregated data. Further, consider a packer who perceives her priors from
daily data (obtained through private market intelligence by the packer’s local field
buyers) at, say, the Texas Panhandle. In this case, it is indeed highly questionable
whether nationally aggregated weekly data from voluntary reports could generate a
market signal that reveals anything that the packer does not already know. As a result, far
from updating her priors, a signal that is less informative than a packer’s priors is likely
to be assigned a zero weight in her posterior. Since the signal is relatively noninformative, it is unable to eclipse the packer’s prejudiced priors in the posterior.
Effectively, this signal is highly unlikely to alter the packer’s strategic decisions or her
subsequent actions.
5

I thank an anonymous referee for the correction that movement of prices is best modeled after a lognormal
distribution. While it is important to keep this in mind, I nevertheless use the normal-conjugate framework
to motivate intuition owing to its well-known simplicity. This simplification does not compromise the
usefulness of the analytical approximation, and it circumvents cumbersome concepts like the logarithms of
trigger prices. Obviously, an empirical study must take this useful fact into account.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization

10

Vol. 1 [2003], Article 14

In sum, the precision of a market signal relative to that of a packer’s priors
determines whether or not the signal will dominate her posteriors. On one hand, if the
precision of a signal is less than that of a packer’s priors, then irrespective of its sample
size, such a signal is unlikely to alter her strategic decisions or actions. On the other hand,
if a signal is more informative than a packer’s priors, it eclipses the prejudice from her
priors in the posterior, and could potentially influence both her decisions and actions.
Proposition I
To update the priors or to influence the strategic decisions and actions of a packer, AMS
market reports must generate a market signal that is at least as precise as the packer’s
priors.

Consider two Bayesian packers who have divergent priors, such that the priors of
packer A are more precise than those of packer B. Suppose both packers gain access to a
market signal that is more precise than their priors. The normal-conjugate framework
predicts that given the relative precision of both priors, packer B’s posterior will weight
the information from this market signal more heavily than will packer A’s posterior.
Hence, both posteriors will converge upon exposure to a market signal that is commonly
more precise than both priors. Effectively, from a commonly more precise signal, packer
B, the less informed packer, learns faster than packer A.
Eventually, as the sample size and the precision of AMS market reports increase,
the resultant market signal updates the priors of both packers so that both posteriors
converge to a more precise joint posterior whose variance approaches that of the
corresponding market signal.6 The implication of this interesting result for mandatory
price reporting leads to the following proposition:
Proposition II
If two packers possess divergent initial priors regarding the price of livestock, then their
respective posterior distribution regarding this factor input price would be almost
identical if both packers are provided with a high number of observations from more
precise data. Moreover, the weight that a packer puts on her (idiosyncratic) prior tends
to zero when the number of observations becomes large or when the variance of the
observations becomes small, and the resultant convergent posterior is more precise
relative to the initial priors.

Proposition I and II imply that increasing the informativeness of AMS market
reports can potentially reconcile some of the interest disparity arising from divergent
priors amongst packers, and thus increase the scope for non-cooperative collusion
through trigger price strategies. Predictably, packers lack the incentive to voluntarily
reveal their priors to AMS. As a result, AMS faces asymmetric information, regarding the
informativeness of publicly disclosed market reports relative to that of packers’ priors,
and the impact of such reports on the subsequent actions of packers.
6

Recall that if the market signal is less precise than both priors, then the packers’ priors will dominate in
the posterior, and since the priors are asymmetric, the packers’ posteriors will remain asymmetric and
unlikely to converge irrespective of the number of observations. This is because packers cannot learn and
therefore update their priors from a signal that reveals nothing they do not already know. If a signal is only
more precise than one of the packer’s priors, the outcome is predictable.
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If AMS increases the informativeness of its market reports through the Act, the
resultant market signals can potentially become more informative than the packers’
priors. In this case, AMS market reports can influence non-cooperative collusion through
trigger price strategies in two ways. First, as described in proposition 2 above, the
ensuing convergence of posteriors can enhance the feasibility of identification of a
unanimous trigger price by packers. Second, since priors converge to a more precise
common posterior, packers are more likely to identify a commonly optimal trigger price
that is closer to the expected collusive price. Effectively, this facilitates participants to
lower the trigger price and enhance the observability of deviations. Ceteris paribus, this
is consistent with improving the policing efficiency of trigger price strategies, hence
promoting the potential for non-cooperative collusion. This is a significant potential
social cost arising from increasing market transparency through the Act.
The objective of the Act is to increase market transparency and thereby, enhance
competition in the meat and livestock industry. However, this study predicts that the Act
can make non-cooperative collusion more attractive for packers by increasing the
efficiency of trigger price strategies and the resultant expected collusive payoffs for
packers. If packers perceive an increase in the benefits from collusion, existing penalties
for detected collusion may no longer be deterrent and the Act would effectively promote
collusion. Thus, to discourage a potential increase in the appeal for collusion, an increase
in market transparency should ideally be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the
monitoring and punishment of collusion.
However, in the case of trigger price strategies, it is very challenging for GIPSA
to detect and therefore punish tacit collusion. If packers truthfully report all their
transactions in full compliance to the Act, the resultant dataset could potentially improve
econometric detection of collusion amongst packers. Nonetheless, it is feasible for
packers to tacitly exploit noisy market signals to collude. Given the challenges of
obtaining incontestable econometric evidence against tacit collusion, it is unlikely that
packer’s fear of such evidence could significantly deter them from colluding. As a result,
in the case of trigger price strategies, it could be prohibitively expensive for GIPSA to
implement command and control policies.
A natural extension of this paper is to examine the determinants of the socially
optimal level of market transparency that can realistically be enforced through the Act. At
this level of transparency, the informativeness of market reports should maximize the
total economic surplus in the meat and livestock industry.
4. Concluding Remarks

The Act renders market transparency endogenous to AMS. However, AMS faces
asymmetric information: a priori, AMS neither knows the informativeness of its market
reports relative to the precision of packers’ priors, nor whether such reports can influence
the strategic decisions and actions of packers. This problem arises because packers lack
the incentive to voluntarily reveal their priors to AMS.
It is important to emphasize that while the scope of this analysis is limited to
trigger price strategies, other strategies are available to packers. Secondly, there exists a
tradeoff between the potentially significant social cost that this analysis identifies and the
considerable desirable outcomes that are consistent with the Act. In particular, the Act
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can reduce the perceived volatility of livestock prices, thus reducing the associated cost
of uncertainty. The present study does not conduct a cost benefit analysis. Moreover, the
model uses the normal-conjugate framework more for analytical simplicity and intuitive
appeal rather than for its accuracy in approximating how packers perceive the movement
of livestock prices. Despite the limitations implicit in its model, this analysis could at the
very least be considered a useful starting point in studying the impact of increasing
transparency under the Act.
The present study has shown that as long as AMS market reports generate a
market signal that is more informative than packers’ priors, then, by Bayesian updating,
divergent priors will converge in the posterior, reconciling interest disparity amongst
packers. In this case, the more informative is the market signal and the greater is the
number of observations that constitute the signal, the greater is the extent of this
convergence. In the limit, packers could feasibly reach complete agreement. Moreover,
the priors converge to a more informative joint posterior. This result has two
implications.
First, the Act can potentially enhance the feasibility of identification of a
unanimous trigger price amongst packers. Second, packers are more likely to identify a
lower and hence more efficient trigger price. A lower trigger price increases the
observability of cheating and enhances the policing efficiency of trigger price strategies.
Effectively, this is consistent with the promotion of collusion and the reduction of market
efficiency. Thus, increasing market transparency under the Act could generate a
significant social cost.
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